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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of taxation on long-run growth in a
two-sector endogenous growth model with (i) physical capital as an
input in the education sector and (ii) leisure as an additional argument
in the utility function. Due to the ﬂexibility of labor supply, taxation
of income may induce agents to spend more or less time on leisure
activities. Income taxation - the same rate applies for capital and labor
income - reduces the growth rate. The contribution of endogenous
leisure in this case is conﬁned to reducing or increasing the size of the
eﬀect on the growth rate. The same is true if only labor income is
taxed. However, if only capital income is taxed, the sign of the eﬀect
may reverse. In that case, the positive eﬀect of the increase in total
non-leisure time dominates the direct negative eﬀect, implying that
capital taxation increases the long-run growth rate.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E20, H20, J22, J24, O41
1 Introduction
Income taxation aﬀects the incentives to invest in diﬀerent sectors of the
economy, potentially aﬀecting the long-run growth rate. This paper stud-
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1ies the impact of taxation on long-run growth in a two-sector endogenous
growth model. The model features both physical capital as an input in the
education sector as well as leisure as an additional argument in the util-
ity function. Endogenizing labor supply through leisure-dependent utility in
models of economic growth has signiﬁcant implications for the dynamics of
these models, see e.g. Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1997) and De Hek (1998,
1999). The present analysis shows that the model may exhibit multiple bal-
anced growth paths, and establishes a necessary condition for the existence
of multiple balanced growth paths. The main purpose of this paper, how-
ever, is to show that the introduction of both features has signiﬁcant and
novel results on the impact of taxation on long-run growth. Most notably,
this set-up implies that capital income taxation may lead to faster long-run
growth.
The taxation analysis focuses on the case of a unique stationary equi-
librium. It distinguishes three tax regimes: income taxation (equal rates on
labor and capital income), capital income taxation and labor income taxa-
tion. Like in the case without a labor-leisure choice, income taxation has
an e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the long-run growth rate. However, depending on the
relative importance of substitution and income eﬀects, a tax on income leads
to a rise or fall in the time spent on leisure activities, which in turn in-
creases respectively reduces the size of the negative eﬀect on growth. The
same is true if only labor income is taxed. However, contrary to the case
without a labor-leisure choice, a tax on capital income may have a positive
eﬀect on the long-run growth rate. This occurs mainly when the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is small, since in that case the income eﬀect
is (relatively) strong, implying that agents tend to work more and/or invest
more time in human capital accumulation - the main engine of growth - in
response to an increase in the tax rate. This reduction in leisure time then is
reinforced as, compared to a tax on income, a tax on capital income induces
more time spent on production and human capital accumulation, because
labor (time) is not taxed. The positive impact of capital income taxation
on growth is shown to hold for sensible parameter values and is robust. In
an extension of the model, the implications of introducing productive gov-
ernment expenditures are studied. The main conclusion from this analysis is
that improvements in the productivity (in the goods sector as well as in the
education sector) aﬀect the growth rate positively.
The eﬀects of income taxation in the context of a two-sector endogenous
growth model have been examined before by many authors. Some of these
studies use numerical simulations of calibrated models to calculate the eﬀect
of tax reform on growth, e.g. Lucas (1990), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993),
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and Hendricks (1999). Others, like Chamley (1992)
2and Mino (1996), examine analytically the eﬀect of (capital) income taxation
on growth. Almost all these studies conclude that a (capital) income tax is
bad for growth. An exception is Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) who show that
higher capital income taxes may lead to faster growth in an overlapping
generations economy with endogenous growth. The reason for this positive
eﬀect is however entirely diﬀerent from the reason in the present paper. They
assume that labor income is paid mostly to the young while capital income
accrues mostly to the old. This implies that a higher capital income tax,
accompanied with a lower labor income tax, leaves the young with more
income out of which to save. If the interest elasticity of savings is suﬃciently
low, the net eﬀect on savings and, therefore, on growth is positive.
The analysis in the present paper is closely related to the analyses in
Rebelo (1991), Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1997) and Ortigueira (1998). In
fact, the model in the present paper is the same as Rebelo’s model with
an endogenous leisure choice (Rebelo, 1991, section III). Due to analytical
diﬃculties, Rebelo conﬁnes his analysis of the eﬀe c to fi n c o m et a x a t i o no n
the rate of growth to numerical simulations. These simulations indicate that
taxing income has a negative eﬀect on the growth rate. The analysis in
this paper shows analytically that this is true. Ladrón-de-Guevara et al.
(1997) establishes that there could be multiple balanced growth paths in the
human capital accumulation model of Lucas (1988) if leisure is endogenously
determined. The present analysis extends this result to the more general
two-sector endogenous growth model, where physical capital is included as an
input in the education sector. Ortigueira (1998) studies the impact of labor
and capital income taxation on the transitional dynamics to the balanced
growth path. He considers both the case of physical capital in the education
sector and leisure as an additional argument in the utility function as two
separate extensions of the basic model. That model is diﬀerent from the
present model in the sense that the tax revenues are remitted as lump-sum
transfers to the households.
From a modelling point of view, the main innovation of this paper rela-
t i v et ot h ep r e v i o u sl i t e r a t u r ei st oc ombine physical capital as an input in
the educational sector and leisure as an additional argument in the utility
function. Previous work has studied models with either the former or the
latter feature, but not with both. The ﬁnding that endogenous leisure may
strengthen or weaken the eﬀect of income taxation on growth, but does not
reverse the sign, depends on this combination. Furthermore, compared to
the model with endogenous leisure but without capital in the education sec-
tor, the present study shows that the combination of both features leaves
the possibility of multiple balanced growth paths intact. The interesting and
novel ﬁnding that capital income taxation may have a positive impact on
3t h el o n g - r u ng r o w t hr a t ei sh o w e v e rs h o w nt ob eac o n s e q u e n c eo ft h el a b o r -
leisure choice. The inclusion of capital as an input in the education sector
actually reduces this possibility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its
solution, including the possibility of multiple balanced growth paths. Sec-
tion 3 analyses the eﬀects of taxation on long-run growth, including income,
capital-income and labor-income taxation, in the unique BGP case. Section
4 discusses the implications of introducing productive government expendi-
tures in the model. A summary is given in section 5.
2T h e M o d e l
Following Rebelo (1991, section III), the model consists of two sectors with
diﬀerent technologies for production and education. A fraction φ of physical
capital K together with NH eﬃciency units of labor, where N is the fraction
of time allocated to labor and H the stock of human capital, are used for the




where A>0 and 0 <γ<1 are parameters. Proﬁt maximization implies that







where r is the interest rate and w t h ew a g er a t e .T h eg o v e r n m e n ti m p o s e s
ﬂat-rate taxes on capital income, τr, and labor income, τw. The analysis will
be undertaken in a closed economy context, but, as noted by Rebelo (1991), is
valid in a world of open economies connected by international capital markets
if all countries follow the worldwide tax system. Furthermore, to focus on the
eﬀects of taxation, government revenues do not aﬀect the marginal utility of
private consumption and leisure or the production possibilities of the private
sector1. Under these assumptions, capital accumulation takes place according
to
·
K(t)=( 1− τr)r(t)φ(t)K(t)+( 1− τw)w(t)N(t)H(t) − δkK(t) − C(t), (4)
1The implications of productive government expenditures are examined in section 4.
4where δk is the depreciation rate of capital and C aggregate consumption.
Human capital accumulation takes place by combining the remaining frac-
tion (1−φ) of the capital stock with (1−N −L)H eﬃciency units of labor,
where L is the fraction of the time used for leisure activities. To focus on the
impact of income taxation, the production of human capital is not included
in the deﬁnition of the tax base (whereas income generated from human cap-
ital is included). In essence, human capital is viewed as a nonmarket activity
whose inputs are not subject to factor income taxation.2 The human capital
stock depreciates at the rate δh. This leads to the following human capital
accumulation equation:
·
H(t)=B [(1 − φ(t))K(t)]
1−β [(1 − N(t) − L(t))H(t)]
β − δhH(t), (5)
where B>0 and 0 <β<1 are parameters.
The government is restricted to run a balanced budget. That is, the
government can neither ﬁnance deﬁcits by issuing debt nor run surpluses by
accumulating assets. Government expenditures, G(t), therefore equal tax
revenues in each period,
G(t)=τrr(t)φ(t)K(t)+τww(t)N(t)H(t). (6)
Inserting the expressions for r(t) and w(t) in the government budget con-
straint implies that G(t)=[ τr(1 − γ)+τwγ]Y (t).
In the presence of an endogenous leisure choice, the preferences of the
households have to be such that in equilibrium the rate of growth of con-
sumption and the allocations of time between work, leisure and human capital







2In support of this case, we can argue that the individual time input (and implicit labor
income) used in the production of human capital - think of student’s time spent on school -
is not taxed. Lucas (1990) and Rebelo (1991) are examples of this case. On the other hand,
human capital accumulation can also be thought of as (partly) a market activity whose
inputs are taxed and/or subsidized (e.g. Pecorino, 1993, Stokey and Rebelo, 1995). The
salaries of teachers, for example, are taxed inputs into the production of human capital.
However, in many countries public spending on education is large and/or human capital
accumulation is subsidized or has favorable tax treatments, limiting the impact of taxation
in the education sector.
3See King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) for a derivation of the class of utility functions
from which this function is taken.
5for σ>0 (1/σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) and 0 <α≤ 1.
The function v(.) satisﬁes the usual regularity conditions with v0(.) > 0
and v00(.) < 0. Tax revenues are used to provide services that enter into
households’ utility functions (see e.g. Barro, 1990). Here we impose an
additive structure, ensuring that G does not aﬀect the marginal utility of
private consumption and leisure. Because households take the government
expenditures as given, government expenditures do not aﬀect the choices of
the households. (However, they do aﬀect the utility or welfare level of the
households, implying that production will be lower than optimal.)
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of inﬁnite sequences
for the quantities {C(t),L (t),N (t),φ (t),K (t),H (t),G (t)},p r i c e s{r(t),
w(t)} and constant tax rates τr and τw such that, taken the prices and G(t)





subject to equations (4) and (5), and such that C(t) ≥ 0, K(t) ≥ 0, H(t) ≥ 0,
0 ≤ L(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ N(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ L(t)+N(t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ φ(t) ≤ 1, K(0), H(0)
given, while the path {L(t),N(t),φ (t),K (t),H (t),G (t),r (t),w (t)} satisﬁes
equations (2), (3) and (6). The parameter ρ reﬂects the time preference of
the households.
In order to have diﬀerent technologies for production and education, γ
and β should be diﬀerent. The most plausible case is that the goods sec-
tor is relatively intensive in physical capital while the educational sector is
relatively intensive in human capital, i.e. γ<β . I nm o s tm o d e l sw i t hh u -
man capital accumulation β is chosen to be one, as in Lucas (1988) and
Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1997).
First, in a competitive equilibrium, the allocation of both physical and
human capital across the two sectors is such that the marginal products of the
two types of capital (measured in terms of units of physical capital) should
be equated in the two sectors, i.e.,
(1 − τr)r = q(1 − β)B [(1 − φ)K]
−β [(1 − N − L)H]
β (9)
and
(1 − τw)w = qβB[(1 − φ)K]
1−β [(1 − N − L)H]
β−1 , (10)
where q is the relative value of human capital in terms of physical capital.
Second, the return from investing one unit in physical capital should be the
same as the return from investing 1/q units in human capital. Hence,
(1−τr)r−δk = βB[(1 − φ)K]











(1 − τr)r − δk − ρ
σα
(12)
with σα =1−(1−σ)α. Last, the optimal allocation of time between leisure
and non-leisure activities requires that the marginal utility of leisure equals





1−α¢−σ (1 − α)C
αL
−α = λqβB [(1 − φ)K]
1−β [(1 − N − L)H]
β−1 H,
(13)
where λ is the current-value shadow price of the capital stock. The derivation
of equations (12) and (13) is given in appendix 6.1.
2.1 The balanced growth path
In a balanced growth path C, K and H grow at constant rates, while φ, N and












z =0 . Using equations (4) and (5), the
·
x =0
equation is given by






− δk = B (1 − φ)




Similarly, by equations (5) and (12), the
·
z =0equation can be written as
(1 − τr)r − δk − ρ
σα
= B (1 − φ)
1−β (1 − N − L)
β x
1−β − δh. (15)
Furthermore, equations (9), (10), (11) and (13), together with the fact that
·











1 − N − L
, (16)






− δk = βB
·
(1 − φ)
1 − N − L
x
¸1−β
(1 − L) − δh, (17)







7This system of equations, consisting of the equations (14)-(18), charac-
terizes a balanced growth path. To solve this system of equations, we need
to impose δk = δh. Then, as is shown in appendix 6.2, the solution of this
system involves the solution of the next two equations in the two unknown
variables N and L:
(1 − γ)(1 − Tψ)N
2 +
+(1 − L){β(1 − γ + Tγ) − (1 − γ)(1 − 2Tψ)}N +
−T(1 − L)
½










(ρ +( 1− σα)δ)(Tψ)−(1−ν)(1−β)β
ν
σαB1−ν [(1 − τr)A(1 − γ)]




β(1−γ) < 1, T ≡ 1−τw
1−τr and ν ≡
1−β
1−β+γ < 1.T h e ﬁrst equation
derives from the
·
x =0equation, whereas the second equation derives from
the
·
z =0equation. To solve this reduced system of two equations, notice
that the ﬁr s te q u a t i o nc a nb ew r i t t e na saN2 + b(L)N + c(L)=0 ,w i t h
c(L) < 0. To keep the analysis clear, we impose the following condition:
Condition 1 Tψ<1.
The reason for imposing this condition is that this ensures that a>0,
which implies that (i) the discriminant (b2 − 4ac) is always positive (hence,
there are only real solutions) and (ii) only one of the two solutions is positive.
Hence - disregarding the negative solution - N can be expressed as a function
of L,s a yN = f(L). Moreover, imposing this condition is not only a device
to establish a unique positive solution, it is also an empirically plausible
condition. As ψ lies between 0 and 1, the condition requires T to be less than
some value larger than one. E.g. if γ =2 /3 (consistent with the usual data
on labor’s share of income) and β =3 /4(>γ ), the condition requires T to be
less than 3/2. Concerning the empirical evidence, Carey and Tchilinguirian
(2000) have constructed average eﬀective tax rates on both capital and labor
income for the OECD countries, which are reported in table 1. The last
column shows the resulting values of T. It follows that 14 out of 21 countries
have a T smaller than 1 and all reported countries have a T that is smaller
than 3/2. Hence, the condition is likely to be satisﬁed in reality. Notice that
this condition is automatically satisﬁed if β =1( a st h i si m p l i e st h a tψ =0 ).
Similarly, equation (20) expresses N as a function of L,s a yN = h(L).
T h e r e f o r ew eh a v eab a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t hi ff(L)=h(L).
82.2 The possibility of multiple balanced growth paths
In this section we shortly review the possibility of having multiple balanced
growth paths in this model. First, we establish a necessary condition for
the existence of more than one balanced growth path. This necessary con-
dition derives from the fact that a balanced growth path is characterized
by the equality of two functions of L, f(L) and h(L). First it is shown
that f(L) is strictly concave. Since a strictly concave function has at most
two intersections with a convex function, and because f(1) = h(1) is one of
the intersections, there will be at most one interior solution if h(L) is convex.
Hence, convexity of h(L) excludes the possibility of multiple balanced growth
paths. This leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 1 Let Condition 1 hold. A necessary condition for the exis-
tence of multiple balanced growth paths is that σ<1+
ρ
αδ.
Proof. See appendix 6.5.1.
Is it likely that this condition holds in reality, or not? Given plausible
values of the relevant parameters - 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.1, 0 <δ≤ 0.1 and 0 <α≤ 1 -
and the empirically estimated range of values for σ -u s u a l l yσ is estimated
somewhere between 1 and 5 - the comparison could come out either way.
However, if the condition holds, this does not imply that there are mul-
tiple balanced growth paths, as it is only a necessary condition. Given the
complexity of the model, to ﬁnd out whether it is actually possible to have
multiple BGP’s we resort to a numerical analysis. It turns out that it is
possible to have more than one balanced growth path, as can be seen in ﬁg-
ure 14.T h i sﬁgure shows the existence of three BGP’s (all of which satisfy
the transversality condition as given in appendix 6.1). BGP 1 and BGP 2
are interior, while BGP 3 is a non-interior balanced growth path (in which
N + L =1 ). See appendix 6.3 for a proof that the non-interior BGP is
characterized by f(L)=1− L (i.e., it lies on the point of intersection of
N = f(L) and N =1− L).
The existence of multiple balanced growth paths raises the question of
the stability properties of the BGP’s. Due to the complexity of the dynamic
system, we investigated the stability of the BGP’s numerically (see appendix
6.4). That analysis implies, similar to Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1997), that
BGP 2 is unstable, while BGP 1 and BGP 3 are stable. Let xi (i =1 ,2,3)
4There are many combinations of the parameters that result in three BGP’s. Another
example, with a higher (more realistic) value of σ,i s :α =0 .3, β =0 .97, γ =0 .5, A =1 .7,
B =0 .385, ρ =0 .07, σ =1 , δ =0 .05, τr = τw =0 .
9denote the capital-human capital ratio at BGP i. Then, given some initial
value x0 (6= x2)t h e r ea r ez0,N 0,L 0 and φ0 such that {x0,z 0,N 0,L 0,φ 0} lies
on a stable manifold and x0 converges to either x1 or x3, depending on the
speciﬁcv a l u eo fx0. The next lemma implies that along the curve of f(L) a
higher value of L is accompanied with a higher capital-human capital ratio.
Lemma 2 Let Condition 1 hold and let x(L,N) denote the optimal capital-
human capital ratio as a function of L and N.T h e n
∂x(L,f(L))
∂L > 0.
Proof. See appendix 6.5.2.
From this Lemma we may conclude that - given the stability properties
implied by the numerical analysis - if x0 is smaller than x2 it converges to x1
and if x0 is larger than x2 it converges to x3. Furthermore, as will be apparent
from the equation describing the growth rate of the economy as a function of
leisure (see equation 21), more leisure lowers the growth rate on a balanced
growth path. Thus, an economy with a relatively high human capital stock
will converge to the ’high-growth’ BGP, while an economy endowed with
a relatively low human capital stock will end up in the ’low-growth’ BGP
(in which the growth rate is actually negative if the depreciation rate δ is
positive).
As a last remark, it should be noted that the existence of multiple bal-
anced growth paths relies on the presence of a labor-leisure choice, i.e. 0 <
α<1.I f α =1 , the model reduces to the basic two-sector endogenous
growth model as described by Rebelo (1991, section III A), which has a
unique interior solution.
3T h e e ﬀects of taxation
This section analyses the eﬀects of taxation - income taxation, labor income
taxation and capital income taxation - on the long-run growth rate. We will
restrict the analysis to the case of a unique interior balanced growth path.
The analysis of taxation in the case of multiple balanced growth paths5 does
not add much to the economic intuition. In particular, the taxation analysis
is practically the same for the stable interior equilibrium (the most plausible
one) as for the unique balanced growth case.
5If h(0) <f(0) it may happen that there is one interior BGP. However, that BGP will
be unstable and the economy will converge to one of the two non-interior BGP’s. This
situation, therefore, falls into the category of multiple BGP’s.
10To ﬁnd the eﬀect of taxation on the long-run growth rate we ﬁrst write








with Q ≡ ψ
(1−β)(1−ν)(βB)1−ν ((1 − γ)A)
ν /σα. See appendix 6.6 for a deriva-
tion of this result. Notice that this expression for the growth rate reduces to
the growth rate in Rebelo (1991, equation 14) if α =1 .
3.1 Income taxation
Taxing (total) income implies that both tax rates are equal, i.e. τw = τr ≡ τ
and T =1 . The above equation for the growth rate shows that, if both
tax rates are equalized to τ, the tax rate has a direct negative eﬀect on the
growth rate of (1 − τ)ν. This direct eﬀect consists of two opposing eﬀects.
First, taxation takes resources away from a productive sector (the capital
production sector) to use it in some unproductive (but utility enhancing)
way. Second, income taxation reduces the marginal products of capital and
labor in the production of capital, inducing the economy to shift resources
from capital production to human capital production.
Moreover, the tax rate has an indirect eﬀect on the growth rate through
its impact on leisure. This indirect eﬀect consists of a substitution eﬀect and
an income eﬀect. On the one hand, due to the reduced return to labor in the
production of capital, more time will be directed towards leisure activities.
On the other hand, taxation reduces the agent’s available income, urging him
to devote more time to the production of physical and human capital.
The determination of the overall eﬀect of an income tax on the long-run
growth rate thus involves the eﬀect of the tax rate on the equilibrium value
of leisure. To ﬁnd this latter eﬀect, notice that, since T =1 ,t h ef u n c t i o n
f(L) is not aﬀected by a change in the tax rate τ. The function h(L),
on the contrary, is aﬀected by a change in the tax rate. In particular, the
nature of this eﬀect (positive or negative) depends on the earlier encountered
comparison between σ and 1+ρ/(αδ):A ni n c r e a s ei nτ induces a positive
shift of h(L) if σ<1+ρ/(αδ) and a negative shift if σ>1+ρ/(αδ).( S e e
ﬁgure 2 for an example of the latter eﬀect.) Hence, higher income taxes
lead to a new balanced growth path with more or less time spent on leisure
activities, depending on the relative value of σ, the inverse of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Intuitively, the higher σ,t h el o w e rt h e
E I Sa n dt h em o r ea n x i o u sa g e n t sa r et os mooth their consumption over time
and, hence, the stronger the income eﬀect. As a result, at a relatively high
11level of σ t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, leading to less
time spent on leisure activities.
Spending less time on leisure activities and hence more time on working,
either to produce output (and capital) or to produce human capital, has
obviously a positive eﬀect on the growth rate, as is also clear from equation
(21). This raises the question whether this (indirect) positive eﬀect could be
stronger than the (direct) negative eﬀect. Analyzing the derivative of g(L)
with respect to the tax rate τ, however, reveals that this situation cannot
arise.
Proposition 3 Let Condition 1 hold. Suppose that there is a unique interior
BGP. Let τw = τr ≡ τ. Then an increase in the tax rate induces a decline
the long-run rate of growth.
Proof. See appendix 6.5.3.
Taxing both labor income and capital income equally reduces the long-run
g r o w t hr a t e .C o m p a r e dt ot h es i t u a t i o nw i t haﬁxed labor supply, the nega-
tive eﬀect of income taxation on the long-run growth rate is either stronger
(i.e. more negative) in the case of a relatively large EIS, which leads to more
time spent on leisure activities, or weaker (i.e. less negative) in the case of
a relatively small EIS, which leads to less time spent on leisure activities.
Smith (1996) ﬁnds a similar but opposite eﬀect of introducing uncertainty
into a one-sector AK model. He ﬁnds that: (i) If the EIS is small, an increase
in the tax rate reduces growth more than predicted by non-stochastic mod-
els; (ii) If the EIS is large, the long-run growth rate decreases by less than
predicted by non-stochastic models.6 The reason behind this result is that in
his model, by construction, an increase in the tax rate reduces both the mean
and variance of after-tax income. The resulting reduction in uncertainty (as
measured by the variance) might increase or decrease the growth rate, de-
pending on the value of the EIS. E.g., if the EIS is small, the income eﬀect
dominates the substitution eﬀect, implying that a reduction in uncertainty
leads to less (precautionary) savings and, consequently, less growth.
If β =1 , that is, if human capital accumulation is independent from









6T h ec o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e nt h ee ﬀects of uncertainty in Smith (1996) and the eﬀects
of endogenous labor supply in the present paper on the impact of tax rates on long-run
growth can de drawn even further. Both analyses show that it is actually possible for a
tax increase to increase growth (see section 3.2 in the present paper).
12This implies that taxes have no direct eﬀect on the long-run growth rate.
Moreover, it can easily be shown that in this case the function h(L) is inde-
pendent from any tax rate (see appendix 6.2). As a result, income taxation
has no indirect eﬀect on the growth rate either. Hence, the ﬁnding that
endogenous leisure may strengthen or weaken the eﬀe c to fi n c o m et a x e so n
growth, but does not reverse the sign, depends on the combination of both
physical capital in the educational sector and leisure as an additional argu-
ment in the utility function.
3.2 Capital income taxation
In this section we analyze the eﬀe c to fac a p i t a li n c o m et a xo nt h el o n g - r u n
growth rate. Let us ﬁrst start with the case in which capital is not an input
in the education sector, i.e. β =1 . In this case, the two depreciation rates
on physical and human capital need not be equal. In fact, the analysis is
feasible7 for δk ≥ δh. The growth rate, obtained from equations (11) and








implying that the capital income tax rate has no direct eﬀect on the growth
rate. A change in the time spent on leisure, then, directly translates into a
change in the growth rate. To ﬁnd the indirect eﬀect of the tax rate through
the eﬀect on leisure, we need to examine, as in the previous section, the eﬀect
of the tax rate on the functions f(L) and h(L), which are (implicitly) given in
appendix 6.2, equations (38) and (39). First notice that f(L) only depends
on the capital income tax rate, τr, through T. The derivative of f(L) with







L − f(L) > 0. (24)
The positive sign of this derivative follows directly from equation (38) by
noticing that (1 − γ)BN2 > 0. A higher capital income tax rate therefore
shifts the function f(L) upwards.
Second, the capital income tax rate has no eﬀect on h(L).T h i si m p l i e s
that, given the existence of a unique equilibrium, the eﬀect of the tax rate
on the equilibrium value of leisure is negative. Since h(0) >f (0) = 0 (see
footnote 4), h(L) - which is monotone in L - intersects f(L) from above,
which implies that an upward shift of f(L) decreases the equilibrium value
of leisure. A rise in the capital income tax rate consequently leads to less
7See Appendix 6.2.
13time spent on leisure activities, and hence to a rise in the rate of economic
growth.
Proposition 4 Given Condition 1, let a unique interior BGP exist. If hu-
man capital is the only input in the education sector, an increase in the tax
rate on (physical) capital income induces a rise in the long-run rate of growth.
Proof. This follows immediately from the consideration preceding the
proposition.
Let us now examine the case in which capital is an input in the education
sector, i.e. 0 <β<1,w i t hδk = δh. Equation (21) reveals that in this case
the capital income tax rate has a direct negative eﬀect on the growth rate
of (1 − τr)(1−γ)ν. The indirect eﬀect is now more complicated as the sign of
the derivative of f(L) with respect to T cannot be established analytically.
However, extensive numerical computations8 show that ∂f(L)/∂T is positive
for all L ∈ (0,1). Then a higher τr, which implies a higher T,s h i f t sf(L)
upwards.
Numerical Result 1 ∂f(L)/∂T > 0 for all L ∈ (0,1).
The eﬀect of the capital income tax rate on h(L) can be deduced from











σαB1−ν[A(1−γ)]ν. Therefore, the eﬀect of the capital income tax
rate on h(L), like in the case of the (total) income tax rate, depends on the
relative values of σ, α, δ and ρ:A ni n c r e a s ei nτr induces a positive shift of
h(L) if σ<1+ρ/(αδ) and a negative shift if σ>1+ρ/(αδ).
Again we can ask ourselves the question whether the positive eﬀect on
the growth rate through a fall in the time spent on leisure activities could
dominate the direct negative eﬀect. While this was not possible in the case
of income taxation, it is possible in the case of capital income taxation to
construct examples in which the tax rate has a positive eﬀect on the long-
run growth rate. Moreover, it is possible for sensible or empirically plausible
8The numerical computations depend on the values of α, β, γ and T, such that 0 <
α<1, 0 <γ<β<1 and 0 <T<1/ψ.
14parameter values. To show this, consider the following benchmark economy:
γ =0 .67,ρ =0 .05,δ =0 .1,σ =3 ,β =0 .95,α =0 .5,
A =0 .5,B =0 .4,τ w =0 .
The value of γ =0 .67 is consistent with data on labor’s share of income;
t h et i m ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e rρ and the depreciation rate δ are usually set
between 0 and 0.1; the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/σ,i su s u a l l y
estimated between 0.2 and 1, see e.g. Vissing-Jørgenson (2002), Mulligan
(2002); labor’s share in the accumulation of human capital is restricted to
be higher than γ, i.e. β ∈ (γ,1]; the parameter α, representing the relative
importance of consumption versus leisure in utility, should lie between 0 and
1; the parameters A and B are chosen to get reasonable values in equilibrium
for working and leisure time and the growth rate. Table 2 shows the impact
of increasing τr from 0 to 0.5 on leisure L and the growth rate g.I n t h e
benchmark economy - see table 2a with σ =3- the increase in the capital
income tax rate induces a decline in the time spent on leisure, from 0.325
to 0.306, which is enough to oﬀset the direct negative eﬀect of taxation on
t h eg r o w t hr a t ea st h eg r o w t hr a t eincreases from 3.71% to 3.82%.T a b l e s
2a - 2i examine the robustness of this result by varying the parameters. The
general picture that arises from these exercises is that the positive eﬀect of
capital income taxation on the growth rate is robust to (small) changes in the
parameters. The most critical parameters are α, β and σ.T a b l e 2a shows
that, according to intuition, the positive eﬀect on the growth rate declines as
σ becomes smaller. Actually, the critical value of σ,b e l o ww h i c ht h ee ﬀect
o nt h eg r o w t hr a t et u r n sn e g a t i v e ,i sa p p r o x i m a t e l y1.54.T h i s s h o w s t h a t
the positive eﬀect on the growth rate is not restricted to values of σ above
1+ρ/(αδ) (which is equal to 2 in the benchmark economy). The restriction
on β is more severe, as is shown in table 2b. Here, the turning point lies
just below 0.92, indicating that the accumulation of human capital should
be highly human capital intensive to exhibit a positive eﬀect. Varying the
parameter α (table 2d) shows a positive eﬀect on the growth rate for α<0.7,
i.e., as long as the appreciation for leisure (compared to consumption) is not
too small. Finally, table 2g shows that starting from a distorted economy
(τw > 0) does not change the result qualitatively.
Notice that the ﬁnding that capital income taxation can have positive
growth eﬀects depends on the endogeneity of the leisure choice. With a ﬁxed
labor supply this result cannot be obtained.
Proposition 5 Let capital be an input in the education sector. Then there
exist conﬁgurations of the parameters such that an increase in the tax rate
on capital income induces a rise in the long-run rate of growth.
15Proof. This follows from numerical simulation of the model (see table
2).
Taxation of physical capital in the output sector reduces the marginal
products of capital and labor (the latter through a fall in φ,t h es h a r eo fc a p -
ital used in ﬁnal goods production) in the production of capital, inducing the
economy to shift resources from capital production to human capital produc-
tion and to leisure activities. This substitution eﬀect concerns substitution
of resources between the two sectors of the economy. With respect to the
time allocated to leisure, this substitution eﬀect is opposed by the income
eﬀect. These eﬀects are similar to the eﬀects of income taxation. Contrary
to total income taxation, taxing only physical capital makes human capital
accumulation even more attractive because the income generated from cap-
ital is taxed, while the income generated from human capital is not taxed.
This extra substitution eﬀect, which concerns substitution between the fac-
tors physical and human capital, allows capital taxation to raise the long-run
growth rate.
I nt h ec a s eo fβ =1 , the growth rate is independent of the tax rate other
than through leisure. This independence arises from the fact that the rate
of return to investment in human capital is equal to B(1 − L) − δh.I n a n
eﬃcient production plan the capital-labor intensity in the output sector is
chosen so that the rate of return to physical capital is also B(1−L)−δh.T h e
resulting eﬀect of capital income taxation on leisure time is unambiguously
negative, giving rise to the positive impact of capital income taxation on the
growth rate.
Decreasing β, however, introduces physical capital into the human capital
accumulation function, causing the rate of return to investment in human
capital and therefore the growth rate to be directly dependent of the tax
rate. The lower β, the higher the direct impact of τr on the growth rate.
As a result, in the case of β<1,ap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of capital income taxation
on growth needs the extra eﬀect of a strong income eﬀect (a relatively low
value of the EIS), causing agents to work more and/or invest more in human
capital as a response to the introduction of capital income taxation.
To get an idea about the robustness of this result with respect to the
functional forms of the production function and the human capital accumu-
lation function9, it is easy to show (see appendix 6.7) that the growth rate
in equation (23) requires human capital accumulation to be a linear func-
tion of the human capital input only but is independent from the functional
9The functional form of the utility function is restricted to the CES-type (see also
footnote 2).
16form of the production function. Thus, given the linearity in the human
capital accumulation function, for any production function, a change in the
time spent on leisure directly translates into a change in the growth rate. A
positive eﬀect of capital income taxation on the growth rate, then, requires
that an increase in the tax rate induces agents to spend less time on leisure
activities. This is a realistic possibility given the clear and plausible reasons
f o rap o s s i b l er e d u c t i o ni nl e i s u r et i m e ,a n di su n l i k e l yt ob et h er e s u l to f
the functional forms being of the Cobb-Douglas type. Moreover, suggested
by the results above, in the case of physical capital as an input in human
capital accumulation the reduced amount of time spent on leisure may still
dominate the direct negative eﬀect as long as the human capital sector is
human capital intensive enough.
A last robustness check concerns a situation in which the education sector
is included in the tax base. If capital in the education sector is taxed too,
this would lower the growth rate as human capital accumulation is made
less attractive, thereby reducing the scope for capital taxation to have a
positive impact on growth. In fact, in the benchmark economy, if we tax
physical capital in both sectors equally (at 50%) the long-run growth rate
actually declines, compared to no taxation. However, a positive impact on
the growth rate is regained if e.g. the tax rate on capital in the education
sector is reduced (due to subsidies or favorable tax treatments) to ca. 25%
or less. Another possibility to regain the positive impact is to increase β,
human capital’s share in knowledge production, to ca. 0.97 or higher.
3.3 Labor income taxation
Let us again ﬁr s te x a m i n et h ec a s eo fβ =1 . G i v e nt h eg r o w t hr a t ei n
equation (23) and the functions f(L) and h(L) (equations 38 and 39 in ap-
pendix 6.2), it is easy to see that the eﬀect of a labor income tax is exactly
t h eo p p o s i t eo ft h ee ﬀect of a capital income tax. A tax on labor income,
therefore, induces a downward shift in f(L), while leaving h(L) unchanged.
Under the same conditions as in the previous subsection, a higher tax rate
on labor income will increase the time spent on leisure.
Proposition 6 Given Condition 1, let a unique interior BGP exist. If hu-
man capital is the only input in the education sector, an increase in the tax
r a t eo nl a b o ri n c o m ei n d u c e sad e c l i n ei nt h el o n g - r u nr a t eo fg r o w t h .
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 4.
Considering the more general case in which capital is an input in the
education sector, equation (21) directly shows that the labor income tax rate
17has a direct negative eﬀe c to nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo f(1 − τw)γν. The indirect
eﬀect of the labor income tax rate through leisure is very similar to the
indirect eﬀect of the capital income tax rate. First, the eﬀect of τw on f(L)
is exactly the opposite from the eﬀect of τr, i.e., a higher τw shifts f(L)
downwards (given Numerical Result 1). Second, the eﬀect of τw on h(L) is
qualitatively similar to the eﬀect of τr and follows from equation (25): An
increase in τw induces a positive shift of h(L) if σ<1+ρ/(αδ) and a negative
shift if σ>1+ρ/(αδ).
What will be the eﬀect of the labor income tax rate on the long-run
rate of growth? If we compare labor income taxation with income taxation,
the use of physical capital in the capital accumulation process is not taxed,
implying that more capital is used to accumulate physical capital and less
to accumulate human capital. This has a negative eﬀect on growth. This
suggests that the eﬀe c to ft h el a b o ri n c o m et a xr a t eo nt h el o n g - r u nr a t eo f
growth is negative. This is conﬁrmed in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 Let Condition 1 and Numerical Result 1 hold. Suppose that
there exists a unique interior BGP. Then an increase in the tax rate on labor
income induces a decline in the long-run rate of growth.
Proof. See appendix 6.5.4.
Hence, increasing the tax rate on labor income reduces the long-run rate
of growth. Like in the case of income taxation, the negative eﬀect of income
taxation on the long-run growth rate, compared to the situation with a ﬁxed
labor supply, is either stronger (i.e. more negative) in the case of more time
spent on leisure activities or weaker (i.e. less negative) in the case of less
time spent on leisure activities.
3.4 Optimal taxation
So far, we have discussed the impact of various tax rates on the economy’s
long-run growth rate. One of the key results shows that increasing the cap-
ital income tax rate can raise the growth rate. The implication for welfare,
however, is not clear. Obviously, the welfare implications depend on the util-
ity provided by government services G, i.e. on the function v(.) in equation
(7). If government services do not provide any utility (v(.) ≡ 0), implying
that the tax revenue is wasted, any taxation will decrease welfare in this
model, as there is no externality or any other friction to block the First
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. If the marginal utility from
government services on the other hand is extremely high for small values of
18G (e.g. limG↓0 v0(G)=∞) taxing capital income (or labor income) to some
degree will improve welfare.
In the ﬁr s ts i t u a t i o nw h e r et a xr e v e n u e sa r ew a s t e di ti so b v i o u s l yo p t i m a l
to abstain from taxation, either on capital or labor income. The second
situation is more complicated. What are the welfare-maximizing tax rates
on capital and labor income when the (benevolent) government can choose
any mix of (linear) capital and labor income tax rates? Answering this
question would imply the comparison of diﬀerent paths - corresponding to
diﬀerent tax rates - given initial conditions. Such an analysis would involve
transitional dynamics. Combined with the fact that we cannot explicitly
solve the model, ﬁnding the optimal tax rates would involve an extensive
numerical analysis well beyond the scope of this paper. What we can do,
however, is to point out two reasons why precisely capital income or labor
income should be taxed. In favor of a positive tax on capital income is the
fact that, since the households take the government services as given, too
much time is spent on leisure compared to the social optimum. This fact is
favorable to capital income taxation because capital income taxation leads to
less time spent on leisure (on the balanced growth path) than labor income
taxation. In favor of a positive tax on labor income is the fact that a tax on
labor income will generate higher tax revenues since labor’s share of income,
γ, is higher than capital’s share of income, 1 − γ.
4 Productive government expenditures
In the preceding analysis we have assumed that tax revenues are used to pro-
vide services that enter into households’ utility functions, without aﬀecting
the marginal utility of consumption and leisure or the production possibili-
ties of the private sector. In this section we will examine the implications of
introducing government expenditures that do inﬂuence the production possi-
bilities of the private sector (infrastructure, education, etc.). See e.g. Barro
(1990) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) for related analyses.
Suppose that government expenditures can be used for either improving
the productivity of goods production, GY, or facilitating the accumulation of
human capital, GH,w i t hGY + GH = G, without generating utility directly









in which the productivity in the goods sector, A(.), is an increasing function
19of government expenditures in the goods sector as a fraction of output10,
with GY(t)=ξ[τr(1−γ)+τwγ]Y (t), 0 <ξ<1. Similarly, let human capital








1−β [(1 − N(t) − L(t))H(t)]
β − δhH(t),
(27)
in which the productivity in the education sector, B(.),i sa ni n c r e a s i n g
function of government expenditures in the education sector as a fraction of
output, with GH(t)=( 1− ξ)[τr(1 − γ)+τwγ]Y (t). The advantage of this
formulation is that the eﬀect of a change in the capital and/or labor income
tax rate(s) is essentially the same as its eﬀect in the model without productive
government expenditures combined with a change in the parameters A and
B.
The eﬀect of an increase in A and/or B o nt h eg r o w t hr a t e( t h r o u g h
b o t ht h ed i r e c ta sw e l la st h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect) runs opposite to the eﬀect of
an increase in the tax rate on income, τ. First, by equation (21), increasing
A and/or B increases the growth rate directly. Second, by equation (20), in-
creasing A and/or B induces more or less time spent on working depending
on the relative value of σ compared to 1+ρ/(αδ). Since raising the productiv-
ity of goods production or human capital accumulation is income enhancing,
it will reduce working time and stimulate leisure time if the income eﬀect is
relatively strong (σ relatively large), and vice versa in the case of a relatively
weak income eﬀect. However, since the productivity improvements aﬀect
both capital and labor in one of the two sectors, the direct positive eﬀect
on growth is always stronger than the indirect eﬀect through leisure11 Thus,
productivity improvements in the output sector or in the education sector
unambiguously raise the long-run growth rate.
The overall eﬀect of an increase in the tax rate therefore depends on the
size of the government-induced productivity improvements. For example, in
the original model with B =0 .25 (and a relatively small σ)12 increasing the
tax rate (on total income) from 0 to 0.165 (which creates the same amount









1+θ. This shows that this formulation encompasses
the one in which G, K and H together display constant returns to scale. However, this
particular functional form implies that G is an essential factor of production, complicating
the comparison with the model without productive government expenditures.
11An increase in A has the same eﬀects as a decrease in τ, implying that the direct eﬀect
on growth is stronger than the indirect eﬀect through leisure (see Proposition 3). The same
result can be derived (along the lines of the proof of Proposition 3) for an increase in B.
12The other parameter values are: γ =0 .67,ρ=0 .05,δ=0 .05,σ=1 ,β=0 .8,α=0 .5,
A =0 .5.
20of government revenues as τr =0 .5) raises leisure time from 0.361 to 0.375
a n dr e d u c e st h eg r o w t hr a t ef r o m2.21% to 1.51%. However, if the govern-
ment revenues G are used to boost productivity in the education sector to
B =0 .264, both leisure time and the growth rate stay roughly constant.
Similarly, it takes productivity in the goods sector, A,t or i s ef r o m0.5 to ca.
0.6 to oﬀs e tt h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the growth rate from taxation.13 Hence,
compared to these growth-neutral productivity improvements, smaller pro-
ductivity increases will (only) weaken the eﬀect of taxation, while higher
productivity increases will reverse the sign. The latter situation makes it
possible that increasing tax rates and (productive) government expenditures
simultaneously has a net positive eﬀect on the growth rate. This is similar to
what Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) ﬁnd, using time series data for the U.S. and
U.K., when they regress per capita income on public policy variables. Their
results suggest that a simultaneous increase in public equipment capital and
marginal tax rates has a net positive eﬀect on growth.14
Similar results apply for the case of a relatively high σ. Although leisure
time now increases as a response to higher productivity in both sectors, the
resulting eﬀect is an increase in the growth rate which may or may not
overtake the initial negative eﬀect of increased tax rates.
The extension of above observations to the cases of capital income and
labor income taxation is straightforward. Improvements in the productivity
i nt h eg o o d ss e c t o ra sw e l la si nt h ee d u c a t i o ns e c t o ra ﬀect the growth rate
positively. This increases the set of parameter values for which capital income
taxation raises the growth rate, and, depending on the size of the government-
induced productivity improvements, opens up the possibility that even labor
income taxation results in a higher growth rate.
5 Summary
The present study analyses the eﬀects of taxation on long-run growth in a
two-sector endogenous growth model with (i) physical capital as an input
in the education sector and (ii) leisure as an additional argument in the
utility function. Due to the ﬂexibility of labor supply, taxation of (capital
and/or labor) income may induce agents to spend more or less time on leisure
activities, depending on the relative sizes of the substitution and income
13Notice that the parameters A and B in both equations (20) and (21) are raised to the
power ν resp. (1 − ν).A sβ is relatively high (γ<β<1), ν is relatively small, implying
that increases in B are more eﬀective than increases in A.
14For more empirical evidence regarding the impact of public capital/expenditures on
output/growth see Glomm and Ravikumar (1997, section 4).
21eﬀects. In the case of income taxation, where capital and labor income
are taxed equally, the resulting eﬀect on the growth rate is negative, as in
the case without endogenous leisure. The ﬁnding that endogenous leisure
may strengthen or weaken the eﬀect of income taxation on growth (without
reversing the sign) is, however, the result of including both endogenous leisure
as well as capital as an input in the education sector.
Capital income taxation increases both the attractiveness of the educa-
tion sector relative to the output sector as well as the factor human capital
relative to the factor physical capital. In this case the direction of the eﬀect
may also change, in particular when the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion is (relatively) small, implying a strong income eﬀect. In that case, the
positive eﬀect of the increase in total non-leisure time dominates the direct
negative eﬀect of the tax rate on growth, implying that capital income tax-
ation increases the long-run growth rate. The possibility of a positive eﬀect
of capital income taxes on growth is shown to be a consequence of the labor-
leisure choice. The inclusion of capital as an input in the education sector
actually reduces this possibility.
Labor income taxation, on the contrary, has a negative eﬀect on the
growth rate, with or without capital as an input in the education sector.
In general, with capital in the education sector, endogenous leisure may
strengthen or weaken the eﬀect of labor income taxes on growth, but does
not reverse the sign.
I ft h et a xr e v e n u e sa r eu s e dt oi m p r o v et h ep r o d u c t i v i t yi nt h eg o o d s
sector and/or the education sector, the impact on the growth rate is positively
inﬂuenced. The eﬀect of taxation on the long-run growth rate then depends
on the size of the productivity improvements. Relatively small productivity
improvements leave the qualitative results unchanged, while relatively large
productivity improvements convert a negative eﬀect on growth to a positive
one. Hence, even labor income taxation may positively inﬂuence the growth
rate as long as the productivity improvements - ﬁnanced with the tax - are
high enough.
Besides the eﬀects of taxation on growth, this study establishes a neces-
sary condition for the existence of multiple balanced growth paths and shows
that, for certain parameter conﬁgurations, the model actually exhibits three
balanced growth paths. This is due to the labor-leisure choice. Whether
capital is included in the education sector or not does not change this result.
226A p p e n d i x
6.1 The consumer optimization problem





















1−α = λ, (29)
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If we deﬁne q ≡
µ









= ρ + δk − (1 − τr)r, (33)
which implies, by equation (29), that the growth rate of consumption is given
by equation (12). Furthermore, by the deﬁnition of q, equation (31) directly
turns into equation (13). Notice that equation (33) implies that q is constant.
Since µ is growing at the same rate as λ and H is growing at the same








It is easy to show that the transversality condition holds if
(1 − σ)α[(1 − τr)r − δk] <ρ . (35)
Notice that the transversality condition is automatically satisﬁed if σ>1.
236.2 Solution to the system of equations (14)-(18)
Let δk = δh. Using equations (2) and (3), equation (14) can be rewritten as
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2−β(1 − N − L). (36)
Note that equation (16) implies that
1 − φ







Tψ(1 − N − L)+N
.
Then, from equation (17), we can derive an expression of x, i.e.,
x =
·






Moreover, it is easy to show that N
φ (1−N −L)=Tψ(1−L)2+(1−2Tψ)(1−
L)N +( Tψ− 1)N2. These observations, togetherw i t he q u a t i o n( 1 8 ) ,i m p l y
that equation (36) transforms to equation (19).
To derive equation (20), we rewrite equation (15) with the help of equation
(11):
βB(1 − φ)
1−β (1 − N − L)
β−1 x
1−β(1 − L) − δ − ρ
= σαB (1 − φ)




B (1 − φ)
1−β (1 − N − L)
β−1 x
1−β [β(1 − L) − σα(1 − N − L)]
= ρ +( 1− σα)δ.
Inserting the expression for x and simplifying yields equation (20).











ρ +( 1− σα)δh
σαB
. (39)
To ensure the existence of a unique positive solution to equation (38), the
depreciation rates are restricted to δk ≥ δh. (This restriction implies that
B(1−L)+δk−δh is positive for all L, such that (i) the discriminant is always
positive (implying that there are only real solutions) and (ii) only one of the
two solutions is positive.)
6.3 The non-interior balanced growth path
The Hamiltonian associated with the restricted optimization problem (in
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z =0equations are now given by
(1 − τr)(1 − γ)A(1 − L)
γx
1−γ +( 1− τw)γA(1 − L)
γx
1−γ = z (44)
and
(1 − τr)r − δ − ρ = −σαδ. (45)
It is easy to show that the solution for L to this set of equations is implicitly
given by







which is exactly equal to equation (19) with N =1− L.
256.4 Stability of the balanced growth paths
To investigate the local stability of the balanced growth paths, we ﬁrst derive
the law of motion of the variables {x,z,L,N,φ}. Elimination of the costate
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γ − B((1 − φ)x)
1−β(1 − N − L)
β
−
ρ +( 1− σα)δ
σα
,
µ(x,L,N,φ)=( 1 − L)βB((1 − φ)x)





By diﬀerentiating each diﬀerential equation with respect to x,z,L,N and φ
in a steady state, we obtain the coeﬃcients matrix of the linearized system
around a steady state. The eigenvalues of this matrix determine the local
stability of the steady state. If all eigenvalues have negative real parts the
steady state is locally stable. If all eigenvalues have positive real parts the
steady state is unstable. If some of the eigenvalues have negative and others
positive real parts, there exists a stable manifold, which is deﬁned as the
set of points on which convergence to the steady state takes place. The
dimension of the stable manifold is equal to the number of eigenvalues with
negative real parts.
I nt h ec a s eo ft h et h r e ee q u i l i b r i ao fﬁgure 1 the (approximate) values of
the eigenvalues, which are given in table 3, imply that BGP 2 is unstable,
while BGP’s 1 and 3 are stable, i.e. both have a stable manifold of dimension
one.
266.5 Proofs
6.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As written in the paragraph preceding Proposition 1, the ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h e
proof is to prove that f(L) is strictly concave. Solving equation (19) for
N = f(L) yields
2(1 − γ)(1 − Tψ)f(L)+( 1− L)Ω =( 1− L)Q (47)
with Q =
¡






> 0 and Ω =
{β(1−γ+Tγ)−(1−γ)(1−2Tψ)}.D i ﬀerentiating this equation with respect
to L gives
2(1 − γ)(1 − Tψ)f
0(L)=Ω − Q +
2(1 − γ)(1 − Tψ)Tαβγ
(1 − α)Q(1 − L)
.







which, since Q>0, implies that
−(1 − L)f
0(L) <f(L). (49)
Using equation (48), the second derivative of f(L) c a nb ew r i t t e na s
f
00(L)=
−2(1 − γ)(1 − Tψ)(αβγT)2
(1 − α)2(1 − L)3Q3 < 0. (50)
This proves that f(L) is strictly concave.
The second step is to ﬁnd out when h(L) is convex and/or concave. It is
straightforward to show that the second derivative of h(L) is given by
h
00(L)=−ν(1 − ν)
(ρ +( 1− σα)δ)(Tψ)−(1−ν)(1−β)β
ν
σαB1−ν [(1 − τr)A(1 − γ)]
ν (1 − L)
ν−2. (51)
Hence, h(L) is strictly concave if σ<1+
ρ
αδ and strictly convex if σ>1+
ρ
αδ.
6.5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From equation (37) we derive that









> 0.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
x(L,f(L)) = η1(1 − L)
γ−β
1−β+γ + η2f(L)(1 − L)
−1
1−β+γ, (53)
with η1 ≡ X0Tψ >0 and η2 ≡ X0(1 − Tψ) > 0 (by Condition 1). Diﬀeren-


















This derivative is positive iﬀ
η1
β − γ




1 − β + γ
f(L)(1 − L)
−1 > 0, (55)









6.5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Inserting τw = τr ≡ τ into equation (21) implies that the growth rate as a







The derivative with respect to τ is, then, given by
∂g(L)
∂τ
= −νQ(1 − τ)
ν−1(1 − L)

























To prove the proposition we will show that this inequality is satisﬁed.
28The total derivative of f(L)=h(L), which applies in a balanced growth










Let h(L)=H0(1−L)+H1(1−τ)−ν(1−L)ν,w h e r eH0 and H1 can be deduced
from equation (20). Then
∂h(L)
∂τ
















νH1(1 − τ)−ν(1 − L)ν−1
f´( L)+H0 + νH1(1 − τ)−ν(1 − L)ν−1, (63)
which should be higher than − ν
1−ν to satisfy equation (59). Hence, equation
(59) is satisﬁed iﬀ
(1 − ν)H1(1 − τ)−ν(1 − L)ν−1
f0(L)+H0 + νH1(1 − τ)−ν(1 − L)ν−1 > −1. (64)
In the case of a unique interior BGP, h(L) intersects f(L) from above, imply-
ing that f0(L)−h0(L) > 0. This allows us to multiply both sides of equation
(64) with f0(L) − h0(L) which yields
f














According to equation (49) this inequality is satisﬁed.
6.5.4 Proof of Proposition 7
This proof proceeds along the same lines as the proof of proposition 3. First,
it is easy to show that
∂g





























Two observations need to be made at this point. First, by Numerical Result 1,
∂f(L)
∂τw < 0.S e c o n d ,i nt h ec a s eo fau n i q u ei n t e r i o rB G P ,h(L) intersects f(L)
















(1 − ν)(1 − β)H1(1 − τw)−(1−ν)(1−β)(1 − L)ν−1
f0(L)+H0 + νH1(1 − τw)−(1−ν)(1−β)(1 − L)ν−1. (70)
I ft h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo ft h i si n e q u a l i t yi sh i g h e rt h a n−(1 − β), i.e.,
(1 − ν)(1 − β)H1(1 − τw)
−(1−ν)(1−β)(1 − L)
ν−1
> −(1 − β)
£




equation (67) is satisﬁed and the proof is done. It is easy to show that this









which is satisﬁe da c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n( 4 9 ) .
6.6 Derivation of the growth rate as a function of L
Equation (2) implies that





















where the second and third equations follow from equations (17) - with δk =
δh - and (16) respectively. Inserting the expression for x as given by equation
(37), yields
(1 − τr)r = ψ
(1−β)(1−ν)(βB)
1−ν ((1 − γ)A)





30Inserting this equation into equation (12) yields the growth rate as a function
of L a sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 2 1 ) .
6.7 A general set-up




H = G((1 − φ)K,(1 − N − L)H) − δhH,
r e p l a c ee q u a t i o n s( 1 )a n d( 5 )r e s p e c t i v e l y .T h eﬁrst-order conditions, then,
read
(1 − τr)r = qG1((1 − φ)K,(1 − N − L)H), (74)
(1 − τw)w = qG2((1 − φ)K,(1 − N − L)H), (75)
(1 − τr)r − δk = G2((1 − φ)K,(1 − N − L)H)(1 − L) − δh, (76)




qG2((1 − φ)K,(1 − N − L)H)L. (78)
Equations (76) and (77) together directly imply that
g =






If G(.,.)=B(1−N −L)H, i.e. a linear function of the human capital input
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33Table 1. Average Eﬀective Tax Rates1, 1991-1997
Per cent
capital income (τr) labor income (τw) T ≡ 1−τw
1−τr
Australia 28.0 22.6 1.21
Austria 18.9 41.8 0.72
Belgium 30.8 39.7 0.87
Canada 38.6 28.7 1.16
Denmark 29.12 42.8 0.81
Finland 19.6 44.5 0.69
France 23.6 40.2 0.78
Germany 19.9 35.9 0.80
Greece 26.8 24.3 1.03
Ireland 18.7 25.1 0.92
Italy 31.0 36.3 0.92
Japan 32.6 24.0 1.13
Netherlands 24.7 41.0 0.78
New Zealand 34.9 24.2 1.16
Norway 20.2 35.5 0.81
Portugal 18.3 22.7 0.95
Spain 20.6 30.4 0.88
Sweden 30.5 48.5 0.74
Switzerland 25.1 30.2 0.93
U.K. 38.4 21.0 1.28
U.S.A. 31.1 22.6 1.12
Simple average 26.7 32.5 0.92
1. The average eﬀective tax rates on capital and labor income are taken from
Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000, Table 4) using the revised methodology.
2. Denmark’s capital income tax rate is for 1991-1996.
34Table 2. The eﬀect of capital income taxation on leisure time,
L, and the growth rate, g
a. Varying σ
σ =2 σ =3 σ =4










β =0 .90 β =0 .93 β =1










γ =0 .5 γ =0 .6 γ =0 .75










α =0 .4 α =0 .6 α =0 .7










ρ =0 ρ =0 .02 ρ =0 .07










δ =0 .05 δ =0 .07 δ =0 .15










τw =0 .1 τw =0 .25 τw =0 .5










A =0 .1 A =0 .3 A =0 .7










B =0 .2 B =0 .3 B =0 .5









Table 3. The (approximate) eigenvalues of the three BGP’s






36Figure 1: An example of multiple equilibria (α =0 .6, β =0 .96, γ =0 .5,
A =1 .8, B =0 .106, ρ =0 .03, σ =0 .35, δ =0 .05, τr = τw =0 ).
37Figure 2: An example of the eﬀe c to fi n c o m et a x a t i o no nt h eu n i q u eB G P
(α =0 .5, β =0 .8, γ =0 .67, A =0 .2, B =0 .4, ρ =0 .05, σ =4 , δ =0 .1,
τr = τw =0 , τr´= τw´= 0.5).
38